The Propaganda of 1776 at 250: Gerald Horne on the Settler Republic, MAGA, US Imperialism, and the Long Counter-Revolution

Editorial Note: This interview took place on June 21, 2026.

Anthony Ballas: Let's begin with a sort of broad overview before we zero-in. This July marks the 250th year of the US settler republic, the first apartheid state as you've called it. And it's been about 12 or so years since your work on the counter-revolution of 1776 , which you have subsequently developed into a series, including the counter-revolution of 1836 , the counter-revolution of 1893 , and your current project on the counter-revolution of 1858 . In a recent piece in The Nation, you weigh the somewhat dual-sided reappraisal of the contradictions of 1776 by the historian Joseph Ellis, but I could just as well cite authors such as Andrew Lawler in his book The Perfect Frenzy wherein he reappraises the settlers’ razing of Norfolk, Virginia in 1775, Timothy Mason Robert’s work on the influence of French Algerian military tactics on the settler republic in the early 19th century, as well as Gunther Peck’s reappraisal of so-called “white slavery” in his sprawling book on the origins of white victimhood, Race Traffic . Although far from a radical reconsidering, there was also Ken Burns's recent series for instance, which presented a reframing, albeit narrow, of the contradictions of 1776. Meanwhile on the cultural front, there have been several recent, suggestive attempts such as Apple TV’s Widow's Bay (2026), or films like The Witch (2015), for example, which tarry with some of the themes of US slavery, settler colonialism, and the mythos of US origins more generally, through admittedly the sort of monolithic, easily digestible “original sin” sort of framework. Finally, there has even been recent efforts to demystify the pre-1776 mythos of the US: recent archaeological research revealing that the “Lost Colony” myth of early Roanoke, Virginia was, indeed, just that: a myth. With these examples, and I’m sure others that you have in mind, what is your analysis of the current state of mythography about the founding of the United States and the propaganda of 1776? What do you make of some of these ideological and historiographical currents reappraising the founding that seem to be underway, even if narrow or myopic?

Gerald Horne: Well, first of all, I would say that the trends seem to be moving in contradictory directions. On the one hand, you have the Trump regime which is using taxpayer dollars to try to restore the “old-time religion” of the shining city on the hill. And to that end has thus far brought successful litigation which has caused the removal of information about George Washington's Philadelphia residence and the presence of enslaved Africans, for example. There are those who are probably familiar with the story of Ona Judge, an enslaved African woman who fled from Washington and was chased down relentlessly by Washington and members of his inner circle and family. That's just one example amongst many of the attempts to sanitize and deodorize 1776. You see this in states like Florida and in Texas.

We would be remiss if we failed to acknowledge the contribution of Nikole Hannah-Jones's 1619 Project . There have been specific and particular attacks upon Hannah-Jones’s efforts, which puts forward the novel idea that a revolt spearheaded by slavers might have had something to do with slavery. At the same time, however, as the reference to Hannah-Jones suggests, there are continuing and continued efforts to try to tell a more accurate story about the founding of this so-called republic. And as Ellis, the Pulitzer Prize winner, who you noted, said in his most recent book , he was prompted in no small measure to revisit 1776 because of the arising of Mr. Trump and the demagogy that the latter has brought to the table. Quite fortunately, Mr. Ellis, unlike many, has not thrown a great wall between the past and the present. I mean, you see that with many even so-called progressive historians. That is to say, they salute the alleged “progressivism” of 1776 but then have trouble understanding––if not writing––about continued indigenous dispossession and the increasing of the number of enslaved Africans from the thousands to the millions on the verge of the US Civil War in 1861. To his credit, Ellis did not go there. He's trying to draw a connection between the past and the present.

Having said that, I think there is more work to be done, particularly with regard to indigenous policy, and particularly with regard to the settlers’ reaction to the Royal Proclamation of 1763, wherein London, after expending blood and treasure in the so-called French and Indian War 1756 to 1763, tried to restrain these settlers from moving further west across the continent. This would force London to fight the indigenous and then turn over the land to those like George Washington who, upon his death, was one of the largest landowners on planet earth not least because of the purloining of indigenous land.

So, we need more about that, for example. I hope to contribute to these ends in a book I'm working on now about Florida, particularly East Florida around St. Augustine, which was under British rule and which carries the reputation of being the oldest European settlement in North America, 1565. Florida was the so-called “dog that did not bark,” as it were, insofar as it was the one colony that did not secede from the British Empire. And some of it has to do with British policy with regard to the indigenous compared to what was contemptuously referred to as the Virginians, meaning the settlers, because many Native Americans had good reason to believe that the settlers were more interested in seizing their land more so than anything else. And so, we need more work on the Native American question in that context.

And also, I guess I should mention this 1858 book that I am also working on, which really goes into this question, though admittedly post-1776. But it does draw a contrast between the policy of the regime in British Columbia across the border from what is now the state of Washington and the state of Oregon, and their policies with regard to the indigenous and the policy of the settler regime. And this still has contemporary import for our moment because if you read the Wall Street Journal, you might have noticed that there has been repetitive denunciation of what's going on in Vancouver, British Columbia, and the attempt, or, rather, tentative attempts, to bring a kind of justice to the indigenous population with regard to the land, for example. The Wall Street Journal sees that as a terrible precedent, and I think many of our friends on the left should pay attention to the fact that in one edition of the Wall Street Journal in the last few months one of the writers quoted Woody Guthrie, “This land is your land. This land is my land,” which is to say, “not the Native Americans land.” And so, I found that very––excuse me for chuckling––but found that very telling. Very telling… very telling.

But in any case, I think that with regard to where we are, with regard to the trajectory of the historiography, I analogize it to Du Bois's Black Reconstruction, which comes out circa 1935. And it takes a while for it to become the new consensus. I think it's fair to say that as of now it is, but it was not instantaneous. And so, I would say that with regard to trying to bring a more accurate picture of 1776 on the, let’s call it, “Du Bois scale,” we're in about 1938 or 1939. There are a number of ways to view that: you could see it as perhaps too little too late or you can see it as highly significant and profound.

Ballas: Since you mentioned Donald Trump and the rise of Trumpism as a sort of spur to contemporary historiography on this subject, let’s also consider the current state of MAGA and the current state of the 1776 propaganda in 2026 on the political front. Although there have been significant and successful efforts on the part of Trumpism and MAGA, speaking of the “1776 Commission ,” and efforts made to suppress the history of US slavery , among other examples, there seem to be significant rifts occurring within the movement as of late. So, on the one hand, on the domestic front let’s say, we're seeing a continuation of the long coup initiated by the Trump regime allied with right-wing forces from January 2021 through the present, inclusive of the recent efforts to establish a slush fund which would essentially function as reparations for January 6 insurgents prosecuted by the Department of Justice in the aftermath of that attempted coup. On the other hand, however, there appear to be clear signs that there are deep rifts forming in the movement following, of course, the genocide in Gaza and the recent debacle in Iran, including Trump’s about-face regarding the conflict. With pro-Zionist forces in a state of panic, which perhaps compounds an already deep schism in the MAGA mediasphere, speaking of Tucker Carlson, Candace Owens, Megan Kelly, and others in the anti-Israel camp, and the pro-Zionist takeover on the other end, spearheaded by Larry Ellison and Barry Weiss at CBS, Paramount, and soon CNN, what is your analysis of these ever-deepening rifts within the MAGA movement? Is this reflective of a crisis in the propaganda of 1776?

Horne: Well, I think it's very significant. I think your summary says it all. And with regard to your summary, I would pay particular attention to the impact of external developments, global developments with regard to these fissures and fractures within the ultra-rightist, neo-fascist movement because, historically, given the strength of class collaboration amongst the settler descendants––in order to push back successfully against the small “r” republicans––we've had to rely heavily upon external events and external forces. One example is the impact of the Haitian Revolution (1791 to 1804) on slavery, which led to a general crisis of that entire system that could only be resolved with its collapse. There is also the impact of the anti-colonial movement allied with the socialist movement in the 20th century, and how US imperialism was in competition with Moscow in particular and found it difficult to win hearts and minds in a rapidly changing world as long as Jim Crow–US apartheid–sustained the US discussion globally.

And so, I think historians of the future will be struck by the impact of the ignominious defeat of US imperialism in Iran and how it helped to ignite ruptures within the ultra-rightist movement, as you are suggesting; ruptures that are still unfolding as we speak that don't seem to be going away anytime soon. But I have noticed, however, that in terms of the latest opinion polls to the extent that you can accord them credibility, Mr. Trump's economic approval rating is about 33% —which some of us might find astounding given his horrible record. But I think that the 33% represents the hardcore of the MAGA movement.

And just as in Israel, those who are Jewish tend to have more influence than the 20% of the population that is not Jewish, for example––meaning that their words and their votes carry more weight. And, similarly, in this neo-white supremacist state, the words and votes of those who are defined as white tend to carry more weight and influence, and so, that 33% is certainly––obviously, self-evidently even––not the majority. But as I have often said, the votes and influence have to be weighed and not just counted. And therefore, it would be a mistake and a blunder of the highest magnitude on our part if we thought that that 33% showed that we're out of the woods so to speak. Of particular note, as your opening comment suggested, is the attempt to bring reparations to the insurgents which in many ways helps to create an insurrectionist army or future opportunities for right wing extremist forces, given that we know MAGA forces are disproportionately sited in the US military, in the US police forces, and in the National Guard. That is to say, those who carried the guns are disproportionately represented within the ultra-rightest movement, and that is something that I think is bracing and something that should not be forgotten easily.

Ballas: It's all so indicative of your wider analysis of class collaboration reaching back through the centuries leading up to 1776 and the development of whiteness historically. Those forces who have allied with the slaveholding, settler class have done so to the detriment of any sort of racial or class solidarity in the 19th century as in previous centuries––Kennard’s recent book, Irregular Army , covers some of that in the 20th and 21st centuries in the military apparatus in particular. In any case, you mentioned external factors, of which I would like to mention one additional point. There have been curious signs of a sort of contemporary reemergence of a theological rift occurring as well between not only Catholics and Protestants, but also an ever-expanding fissure occurring within Catholicism itself, which is a topic that you've explored in your work on the development of the identity politics of whiteness in the 16th and 17th centuries. A couple of years back in conversation, we suggested that it’s possible that we may be witnessing “a shift back to religion as the dominant identity marker of difference,” which seems to be competing for primacy over race, for instance, in the US context if not abroad. And evidence for this shift may be found in the Vatican’s recent rebuke of the US-Israeli alliance and their depredations committed in Iran. And we have seen Vice President JD Vance recently issuing his own sort of retort in response to Pope Leo just a few days ago on this front, signaling a potential internal split within global Catholicism. Starting about a year ago, there has also been quite a lot of noise in the mainstream press about the Catholic criticism of the US-Israel alliance, especially following the assassination of Charlie Kirk who was reportedly in the process of converting to Catholicism prior to his assassination. What do you think this schism in contemporary Christendom, and Catholicism in particular, might signal? How might this rupture and the religion question more generally factor into these political divisions and their relationship to 1776 historically and today?

Horne: Well, we should not ignore the impact of religion. And I think sometimes there's a tendency among those who consider themselves to be materialist to suggest that since religion by its very nature is not necessarily material, therefore it can be easily dismissed or discarded, which I think is a significant blunder. As you suggested going back to the origins of the settler regime not least here in North America, what needed to be reconciled were the splits within Christianity after Martin Luther's secession from the Vatican in 1517, then his particular creed takes hold in London under Henry VIII by the 1530s, igniting a round-robin of religious wars between Protestants and Catholics. To a certain extent, that religious split still manifests in Northern Ireland, for example.

And as a footnote, we may want to pay careful and close attention to the recent racist pogroms in Belfast with the targeting not only of Africans but also, as I understand it, of Ukrainians as well. And what we need to ascertain is the impact of this particular dustup, which was cheered on by Elon Musk–in the midst of becoming the first welfare trillionaire–taking time to egg on the racism. So, we need to put our thinking caps on with regard thereto.

But, back to the major thread, as I argued in Dawning of the Apocalypse, what happens is that the scrappy underdogs that are Protestants are outnumbered by the Catholics, who of course were longstanding, and in a sense they are able to improvisationally work out a new politics of identity. You then see a kind of building of bridges between those who have been warring on the shores of Europe––English versus Irish, English versus Welsh, English versus Scots, British versus German, German versus Pole, Pole versus Russian, and so on. Thereafter, when they cross the Atlantic, they magically are transformed into white.

Now, propaganda to the contrary, this was not a smooth process. As I talk about in the book that was just published, Slavery, the Slave Trade and the Roots of US Imperialism , there was significant anti-Jewish fervor in the early Republic. Now, in typical one-sided fashion, many have quoted this conciliatory letter from George Washington himself to a Jewish synagogue in Newport, Rhode Island in the 1790s, offering them citizenship and all the rest. But what is often times neglected, as I talk about in this forthcoming book, is not only the anti-Jewish fervor amongst other founding fathers but how that was fed by the fact that an early crisis for the Republic was the ensnaring of Euroamerican sailors, particularly in Algiers, Tunis and, Tripoli where they became captive laborers. The allegation was made that, particularly in Algiers, the power behind the throne were Jewish financiers, and that helped to feed a pre-existing anti-Jewish fervor right here in North America.

Now, the United States was able to overcome that. I won't get into that book because that would take us another hour or two. But I cite that only to suggest that problems––religious problems––remain a factor in the contemporary political landscape of the United States of America. This is not only with regard to the dust up between Pope Leo and other Catholics like JD Vance. And of course, JD Vance is a convert to Catholicism as he says in his latest book, Communion. The former speaker Newt Gingrich is also a convert to Catholicism. A significant number of US Supreme Court justices are Catholics. As a matter of fact, Catholics, to a degree, are overrepresented on the US Supreme Court.

And, the fact that you're still having attacks on synagogues, combined with the Islamophobia that's particularly rearing its ugly head in Texas where it's become quite blatant and quite offensive, should remind us that there's a certain regression ideologically with regard to the recrudescence of this backwards religiosity. In a sense it is an effort to push us back to the 17th century, to 16th century, and perhaps earlier centuries. I draw an analogy to which I think that many of my Black American friends would probably object, given our high rates of incarceration and infant mortality rates and execution of the death penalty, but many in the ultra-right feel that other communities are easier to pick on than the Black American community. And then that brings us right back into Islamophobia. It brings us back to the revival of backwards religiosity.

It's just like Mr. Trump. He made it clear that he finds China and Russia too formidable right now to confront frontally. But there are easy pickings, as he sees it, in this hemisphere. He sees the Europeans, the European Union as easy pickings for example. And so, what this does is complicate tremendously the way forward. What it means is that we need new alliances. We need different kinds of alliances. We need new ideological offensives, offensives that perhaps we have not yet thought of, for example, given this changing alignment of forces that we're facing. To use another analogy, it's clear that drone warfare is helping to change battlefield confrontations. And it would be the poor general or the poor West Point instructor who would not take that into account in terms of devising military strategies or battles in 2026 or 2027. And so, likewise, the changing race-cum-religious landscape, the changing ideological landscape, and so forth, this all demands, and even commands, new approaches–or perhaps even the revival of old approaches.

Ballas: Your answer just reminded me of this sort of alignment in the late 1950s or early 1960s with the Vatican II reforms and the emergence of a liberation theology that was adapted in the United States via James Cone , and which even embraced Black power and had a relationship with socialist politics as well in that era. And then, reaching back into the previous centuries, since you mentioned early Virginia, after Bacon's rebellion, there was a lot of fear in the New Light Anglican movement that “Portuguese-speaking Africans” may cause trouble from Florida and all along the coast insofar as they may have some sort of revolutionary influence on the enslaved Africans in Virginia, and, therefore, that caused a sort of theological as well as political panic in that region after 1676. The Virginian aristocracy was worried leading up to Stono in 1739 and after, and had acute anxieties about Spanish–and I think even more so French–Catholicism, with the 1722 conspiracy, the 1730 Baptism plot, the 1756 Acts, and so forth. So, this seems to go hand-in-hand with your critique and analysis of class struggle and, once again, of class collaboration, and the question of religion in the longue durée of hemispheric whiteness.

You also mentioned the Supreme Court, and I want to bring up the recent Supreme Court challenge to the Voting Rights Act this past April, which seems to suggest 2026 may well prove to resemble 1776 more explicitly than some of our friends on the left may have previously imagined or acknowledged. And this, of course, coincides with the efforts to eliminate birthright citizenship that are ongoing, despite the Supreme Court’s recent ruling against the Trump administration on this front. Nevertheless, these efforts have all been in tandem with the ongoing efforts to ban the vote-by-mail system, the attempted seizure of Michigan voting information during the 2025 ICE invasion, and the successful retaliatory seizures of 2020 voting information in Fulton County, Georgia in February of this year, all of which seem to suggest that we may well witness yet another attempt to curtail the already beleaguered “democratic” process come midterms this November. I know the US Postal Service has often been at the center of the crisis of federalism historically, from Thomas Jefferson banning Black postal workers in the early 1800s in response to the revolution in Saint Domingue, to the postal strikes of the 1970s, as well as the persistent right-wing attempts to privatize the postal service more recently under the tenure of Louis DeJoy. With what I’ve just put on the table, Dr. Horne, how might we expect this crisis to deepen in the coming months or years and what do you make of the crisis of federalism more generally?

Horne: Well, first of all, on a lighter note, when you mentioned the post office, I think of the classic film by Robert Townson, Hollywood Shuffle, where the tagline, which becomes the title of a book of the same name on the same topic, is “there’s always work at the post office.” I'm not sure, of course, if that was a message directed to Black workers in particular because we all know that Black workers are overrepresented in the public sector––the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) and the Service Employees International Union (SEIU)––and underrepresented in the private sector, which, of course, is heavily non-union.

With regard to the federalism crisis, the first thing that comes to mind, once again, is Elon Musk, specifically his attack on Delaware, which has been the major home historically for corporations incorporating going back quite a while. But the special courts in Delaware did not smile upon some of his compensation packages from Tesla in particular. And so, therefore, that led his fast break to incorporate in Texas. Others are seeking to incorporate in Nevada. And what you see is how big capital engages in this sort of arbitrage between and amongst the 50 states. That is to say, if one state seems to be recalcitrant from their point of view, they'll move to another state. If Mr. Musk has sought to move incorporation from Delaware to Texas, obviously the US Supreme Court supposedly has the ultimate say on these sorts of things. You know, they're like Groucho Marx in the sense that Groucho Marx says, “Well, if you don't like these principles, don't worry, I have others.” In other words, sometimes the Supreme Court is taking a position that seeks to validate states’ rights and other times it takes positions that seek to validate federal power depending on whose ox is being gored. Basically, that seems to be the operative principle, for example.

So, I think this will also have import for the European Union, which is a kind of federal system to a degree. Although admittedly, Brussels does not wield as much influence as Washington, but the principle is similar. Whereas when there is an attempt to secede from the federal union in the US it leads to a civil war, Brexit (the British exit from the European Union) did not lead to a civil war, for example. But, interestingly, Mr. Trump is having significant impact on the European Union, not only in terms of their Ukraine policy, but also in terms of Iceland and Norway, which are not altogether in the European Union, and are now reconsidering their relationship in light of Mr. Trump's aggressive posture towards Canada and Greenland, for example.

Part of the problem we have with regard to federalism and states’ rights on this side of the Atlantic has to do, I think, with the fact that we really need more progress ideologically in our little, yet substantial, legal community concerning these matters. I think our legal community––at least many of them––have not necessarily kept pace with some of the literature we mentioned at the top of our discussion. Now, that's not altogether accurate. I mean, for example, contrary to what I just said, I would point to Michael Klarman of Harvard Law School in his book, The Framer's Coup , which makes a significant intervention in terms of an understanding of the Constitution. But, to show you how this works, despite the fact that Klarman is at Harvard Law School, the apex of the legal community, I'm not sure if his thinking is consensus thinking with regard to the legal community more broadly. In other words, we still need agitation from the bottom up in order to ensure that these ideological changes, this ideological progress, becomes stronger and becomes more permanent. And I'm confident that that process will unfold.

Ballas: Just to make another quick note on the legal community, if I may. Aziz Rana’s book, The Constitutional Bind , has had a hand in what you're talking about. He's trying to generate a different scholarly argument about how vaunting the US constitution, the reverence surrounding it and so forth, was really a 20th century phenomenon. And then, recently as well, Nina Farnia has written a couple interventions in the CUNY Law Review examining the architecture of the US legal system and its relationship to fascism.

I’d like to ask you another question about US imperialism, but before we get there, I want to ask you about the progressive movement's relationship with the propaganda of 1776. I'm thinking specifically of Alexandria Ocasio Cortez's recent comments at the University of Chicago in conversation with David Axelrod characterizing 1776 as a working-class revolution, but there has seemingly been no scarcity of this kind of mythologizing or romanticizing rhetoric issuing from the US left and social democrats in particular. What do you make of the persistence of this kind of rhetoric and how do you recommend that the US left orient or perhaps reorient itself to this history and propaganda of 1776 in 2026 and moving forward?

Horne: Well, with regard to Congresswoman Ocasio Cortez, the recommendation I have made is that she, as well as members of the Congressional Progressive Caucus, the Black Caucus, and the Hispanic Caucus should designate a member of their staff to become current with literature concerning not only 1776, but other trends––other promising trends––that will have impact upon policy, for example. And if their staffs are overstretched, perhaps they could assign that task to summer interns, because Washington, DC, Albany and Sacramento are flooded during the summer with college interns and I'm sure they would be more than willing to read up on these matters and then present a summary to the Congress member or Congress members. I think when a person as respected as Congresswoman Ocasio Cortez makes a statement such as the one you just cited, it leads to a loss of credibility which is not positive for our movement given her influence, and it seems to me that this is a problem that ought not be that difficult to address.

Now, addressing the other part of your question, you know, it's hard because although I must be honest and say that for whatever reason, the Black community, at least the Black nationalist community and to an extent the Black youth community, doesn't have as much of a problem understanding the mythology behind the creation myth of 1776 as many other communities. I think it's because of their–our–lived experience which leads to questioning and pondering as to why we are treated the way that they–we–are. I mean, I'm in New York City right now, and whenever I come to New York, I can almost feel my blood pressure go up because of the way I'm encountered here and the way I'm treated here. And obviously when that is happening, it should cause reflection. And perhaps other communities do not have the same problem. So therefore, there's less pressure to rethink.

But as I said, this is a protracted struggle and, as I said before vis-à-vis the “Du Bois” scale of Black Reconstruction circa 1935 or 1936, we're now, with regard to the founding of the US, in maybe 1938 or 1939. Or, to use another analogy, we're in the second or third inning of a nine-inning game that actually might go to extra innings concerning our understanding of the founding.

As you know, I'm currently researching for my Florida project and I'm reading this dissertation from the University of Florida from a decade or so ago. It's really quite good. I haven't looked up the author to see what happened to him, but I doubt––well, I won't prejudge until I find out… But, I mean, for example, he says the lingo in terms of the scholarship is that you should not refer to George Washington at all as the “patriot,” even though they were rebelling against the government. I thought “patriots” were supporting the government. So, in other words, you have to take the outcome of the rebels prevailing post-1776 as though it were logical or inevitable and then refer to them retroactively as “patriots” even when you're talking about 1771. And this scholar, you know, he has a whole critique of that which is actually correct and so obviously he's on to something. But what that speaks to is the uphill climb because it's not as if in a society like this you necessarily get bouquets as a result of being accurate and correct. You get bouquets to the extent that you reflect the prevailing consensus and the prevailing political line. So, I mean it's obvious that that is a problem. It's obviously not enough to have an accurate rendering of the past––you need to have a movement that agrees with your accurate rendering of the past.

Ballas: Just a quick point on that, specifically on the rhetoric of patriotism. Kenneth Burke, who was this mid-century (somewhat Marxist) rhetorician, and actually who was involved in the first American Writers Congress in 1935 , although he had a somewhat contentious relationship with some of the comrades from that Congress, he reminds us of the very basic idea that Marx puts forward of the definition of “ideology” from The German Ideology before it takes on these increasingly abstruse theoretical permutations in the 20th century. And it's precisely what you just said, in fact, which is, essentially, when an effect is presented as if it were the cause. And that's perhaps the sort of analysis of false consciousness that we need to return to when we're doing this sort of analysis of the history and propaganda of 1776.

I have one question on the current state of US imperialism. US imperialism––and you already alluded to this somewhat––was delivered a crushing setback with the signing of the memorandum of understanding between the US and Iran on June 17, 2026 in Versailles, followed swiftly by the breakdown of that agreement. Meanwhile, the Trump regime's imperialist efforts in Latin America and the Caribbean basin have left hundreds of civilians killed by drone strikes off the coast of Trinidad and Tobago and have also left millions of Cubans in dire straits as a result of the economic blockade. Not to mention the kidnapping of Nicolas Maduro and Celia Flores to kick off 2026, among numerous other incursions and imperial postures beside. With Iran deciding to close the Strait of Hormuz citing Israel's attacks on Lebanon, and with regard to these other iterations of US aggression in both hemispheres, what is your analysis of the current geopolitical conjuncture into which this particular MOU has manifested and ultimately broken down so quickly? And what is your analysis, thus, of this stage of US empire more broadly?

Horne: Well, the plot is still unfolding as we speak, but that does not relieve us of the responsibility of seeking to analyze it. The memorandum of understanding is obviously going to cause divisions within the US ruling elite. We'll get an idea of the impact with regard to the June 23, 2026 primaries in New York State. And one race to pay particular attention to is the one between incumbent Congressman Daniel Goldman, who is a captive of the Israeli lobby, and his opponent Brad Lander, who is critical of Israel's government and is allied with Mayor Zohran Kwame Mamdani. They cross-endorsed each other when both were running for mayor of New York City last year. And then Mamdani, of course, is running a slate of candidates in these primaries with the issue being Israel, interestingly enough. But as I pointed out to a friend this morning, part of the problem is that the emphasis has not necessarily been on Staten Island, which is the settler descended working- and middle-class bastion, which is almost taken as though it were normative and thus conceded to as though it’s going to be the bulwark of the right for example. But this hardly receives attention. Then, that puts pressure on all these other communities to move to the left. And I'm not sure how that's going to eventuate in the long term, to be honest.

With regard to this hemisphere more broadly, as the national security strategy of the White House as of November 2025 suggested, I think that Washington feels that it's problematic at this moment to confront China , which is obviously the big enchilada. You saw that manifested in 2025 with the eye watering 145% tariffs in April 2025 and then the embarrassing climb down by Mr. Trump and South Korea in November 2025 after China laid its gun on the table, speaking of rare earth minerals, while also cutting back their exports to the United States which would have thrown a monkey wrench into the operations of automobile manufacturing among other sectors. And then there's the rather servile performance by Mr. Trump in Beijing in May 2026 during his trip there.

And it's easy to infer that US imperialism feels that it needs to bulk up to a certain extent. It needs to improve its profile in the sense that China has four times the population of the United States, perhaps more, and has leadership with regard to quantum computing and green energy which are obviously of importance given the problems in the Persian Gulf of late in terms of shipping petroleum, and so forth. And so that brings us back to what we said a moment or two ago concerning what are perceived as easy pickings in the hemisphere: Venezuela, the Colombian elections, the runoffs of which take place today [Sunday June 21, 2026], and the Trump donor and US citizen, Abelardo de la Espriella, may wind up being the next leader of Colombia. The Trump regime’s “We Need Greenland” campaign, which was intimidating to the Greenlanders and to Denmark, their ostensible colonial master; the imperial rhetoric with regard to Canada as the 51st US state; the secessionist referendum in Alberta, the oil-rich Canadian province, which is set for a few months from now… what's happening is that the hemisphere is in jeopardy because of the crisis of US imperialism and US imperialism's idea that it's not only foolhardy to confront the China-Russia alliance as it now stands but that if it should be confronted it should be confronted in a new way with all of these other appendages under its belt, speaking of Venezuela, they would say Cuba, they would say Alberta, they might even say Canada, for example.

Now, obviously that opens the door for the progressive movement in this country to reach out to Canada, to Cuba, to Colombia, to Venezuela. But, as we've said many times before, part of the devil's bargain leading to a retreat of US apartheid was, in return for these anti-Jim Crow concessions, there would be a move away from internationalism. And now we're coming to see the problem with that approach.

Ballas: Following directly from what you were just saying regarding this rearrangement of the hemispheric forces, the right-wing forces in both hemispheres have faced some setbacks recently, with the defeat of Orbánism in Hungary and the defeat of Bolsonarismo in Brazil perhaps most evident in this regard, while in Albania you have this massive push back against the land grab efforts of Jared Kushner and Ivanka Trump. I'm wondering if these are symptoms or signs that this rearrangement may be in peril and I’m curious what these signs may portend?

Horne: There are so many signs. I mean, we could have talked about the South Africa policy; South Africa's leaders being barred from the G7 in France just a day or two ago––presumably they will be barred from the G20 in South Florida a few months from now as well. The anti-immigrant policy of the US administration, except for 6,000 so-called Afrikaners, who have been admitted into this country. Obviously that's having significant impact on South African domestic policies, but I'm glad to see that you mentioned Albania given not only the folks in the streets concerning the Kushner's attempt––that's Trump’s son-in-law, Jared Kushner, married to Mr. Trump's daughter––and their attempts to seize Albanian property. This is important because this small country of Albania has played an outsized role believe it or not in politics since 1945. I mean, for the longest it was Maoist China's closest ally, for example, during the heyday of Maoism in the 1970s. And since I'm talking about Kushner, I should also mention his father Charles Kushner, the billionaire from New Jersey, now ambassador to France, who was prosecuted by then-US Attorney Chris Christie who went on to become governor of New Jersey. Regarding the elder Kushner, I won't even go into the seamy details of what he sought to do, since it’s something from a bad Hollywood movie, but what I would like to mention is something I found useful although it often passes by without comment, let us say. The New York Times reported that the US ambassador to France, Charles Kushner, gave special attention to the US Jewish soldiers who were killed on D-Day. Now, if you had a Black American ambassador who would pay special attention to the Black American soldiers, oh, well, then you would hear the familiar refrains of “identity politics,” and “narrow nationalism,” emanating and reverberating all around you. Our friends on the left really should be at the forefront of pointing out these contradictions, but too often they go right over their heads. But, in any event, I'll throw the microphone back to you.

Ballas: I’d like to ask you a follow up, actually. Recently, as you probably know, we've also seen that Peter Theil has decided to defect and leave California to set up shop in Buenos Aires. I’m curious, what do you make of this particular phenomenon amid the broader realignment of reactionary, hemispheric forces?

Horne: Well, you know, this is like musical chairs, the childhood game where when the music stops, each child needs to find a chair or else they’re out of the game. So, presumably, Mr. Theil feels that the music may be stopping concerning what's happening in the US economy–the billionaire's tax in California, for example–which might not go to the ballot in November, but it's causing a sort of mass exodus of the 1% to Florida and Nevada, for instance. It actually ties back to what we mentioned a moment or two ago about arbitrage, federalism versus states’ rights, etc. Although we thought he was on his way to New Zealand, he turns up in Buenos Aires. But he should be careful because Buenos Aires over the decades has had a rather potent left-wing movement, and it would be a mistake for him to assume that that movement is dead, or that it is incapable of flexing its muscles. Just like the Kushners have helped to revive progressivism in Albania, Theil may be able to revive progressivism in Buenos Aires.

And I should also mention as well that he has another connection to our discourse, insofar as he spent some of his youth in South African occupied Namibia, a former German colony in southwestern Africa, which was the site of the first genocide of the 20th century against the Nama and Herrero people from 1904 to 1908. So, it’s just like the billionaires who are moving to South Florida at a time when tensions were being ratcheted up with Cuba. I hope their advisers are telling them that if Mr. Trump goes too far, Cuba's disadvantage of being close to the United States could be an advantage in terms of being able to reach Key West and Miami Beach and other venues of the rich and famous rather easily. Sometimes you wonder who's advising these people.

Ballas: I have one final question for you Dr. Horne, and I’ll also try to pull some of these threads together and round us out a bit. Last year, we figured Trump through a literary parallel as a sort of Sutpen-like character straight out of William Faulkner’s 1936 novel, Absalom, Absalom!, which is a sort of gothic rumination on the historical founding myths of the “old south,” and really the formation of the United States more broadly, which is to say, the history of the development of a white identity politics as one of the central historical forces animating the propaganda of 1776. Today, with the current political and ideological state of MAGA, and also the current architectural state of 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, in particular speaking of the demolition of the East Wing and the UFC 250 event of June 14, 2026, perhaps yet another analogy could be found in a sort of grotesque combination of Edgar Allen Poe’s “The Fall of the House of Usher ” and P.T. Barnum , the 19th century purveyor of the “sideshow.” Whatever the case, you've said before that the US seems to be increasingly employing 19th century tactics domestically and abroad, and certainly the cultural response to this seems to suggest a sort of return to certain lurid, gothic forms indicative, perhaps, of a certain pessimism.

We also see recent fantasy plots like the one attempted by a Texan duo in 2025, who had plans to invade the Haitian island of Gonâve , murder all the men, and enslave the women and children. It is not at all coincidental that this kind of plot was hatched contemporaneously with the Trump regime’s anti-Haitian propaganda, which saw JD Vance and the late Charlie Kirk among others propagating all manner of vitriol against Haitians in the US and in Haiti. This was also contemporaneous with the broad deployment of fascist foot soldiers from ICE to Ohio, Michigan, Washington, DC, Southern California, and elsewhere, which we also touched upon. With this kind of regression in mind, Dr. Horne, what is your ultimate analysis of the state of the settler and slaveholders’ republic in 2026 as it passes into its 250th year as we continue to confront and combat the long US counter-revolution?

Horne: Well, what I find remarkable and perhaps even telling is that even in the mainstream press’ reflections on the 250th anniversary, some have raised doubt as to whether or not there'll be a 275th anniversary or a 300th anniversary of the United States. I think it bespeaks an understandable pessimism at the highest levels of US society. And, although in the articles I've read, there has been little reflection upon what might replace this republic, we do know, for example, that the sovereignty movement in Hawaii is quite advanced organizationally and politically. It would not surprise me at all if Hawaii is able to somehow reverse the coup of 1893 and resume sovereignty, for example. I think, ultimately, if that happens, it will be a shot in the arm for other indigenous movements from the Atlantic to the Pacific.

As I've suggested in other venues , I think that in the long term what may happen in the United States and what could happen in the United States is a replay of the Lancaster House Agreement talks of 1979, 1980 that led to the independence of Zimbabwe. That is to say, in 1965, European settlers admittedly inspired by 1776, revolted against African majority rule, “one person one vote,” and set up an independent racist state that led to a war. Then, this led to talks convened by the erstwhile colonial master in London which led to the independence of Zimbabwe. I think that ultimately we may wind up before the century is over with similar talks in London presided over by the former colonial master with all the stakeholders at the table, at which case we would have obviously very protracted negotiations as to what would ensue in terms of different forms of sovereignty in terms of reparations, for example. This would either complement sovereignty, or, in lieu of sovereignty, it would either all be up for grabs or it would all be up for negotiation.

But alas, before we reach that day, I think that there will have to be more organizational strength and more ideological advance exhibited by our forces.

Gerald Horne holds the John J. and Rebecca Moores Chair of History and African American Studies at the University of Houston. He is the author of more than thirty books, including most recently, The Counter-Revolution of 1893: The Hawaii Coup, and the Roots of U.S. Imperialism in the Asian-Pacific (International Publishers, 2026).

Anthony Ballas is a PhD student in literature, host of the De Facto Podcast and co-host of the Cold War Cinema Podcast. His work can be found in Peace, Land, & Bread, Truthout, Black Agenda Report, 3:AM Magazine, CounterPunch, Scalawag, Caribbean Quarterly, and elsewhere.